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THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE WEBB-
KENYON ACT.
The Webb-Kenyon law, which is the latest step by Congress in
the struggle to subject interstate commerce in intoxicating liquors
to the state prohibition laws, has been before the courts recently in
a number of cases. Prior to the Webb-Kenyon Act the state of the
law was as follows:
The United States Supreme Court had held, under the commerce
clause1 of the Federal Constitution giving Congress the power to
regulate commerce among the several states to the exclusion of the
states, that the states in the absence of Congressional permission had
no power to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor in the original
package in which it was shipped from another state.2 This holding
made it possible to evade the effect of the various state prohibitory
liquor laws by the simple expedient of having the liquor shipped in
from another state.
Thereupon, Congress passed the Wilson Act3 of 1890 which
made intoxicating liquors, transported in interstate commerce, sub-
ject to the exercise of the police power of the state upon arrival
therein in the same manner as though such liquors had been pro-
duced in the state or territory into which the same were shipped.
Under this law, it was decided that the liquor did not become subject
to the police power until it had been delivered to the consignee, and
that the consignee acquired the right to use the liquor.4 Still, the
evasion of the state liquor laws was readily accomplished.
On March 1, 1913, Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act over
the veto of President Taft, who objected to it on constitutional
grounds. The Act is as follows:
"An Act Divesting Intoxicating Liquors of Their Interstate
Character in Certain Cases.5
"Be it enacted, etc., that the shipment or transportation, in any
manner, or by any means whatsoever, of any spirituous, vinous,
malted, fermented, or other intoxicating liquor of any kind, from
one state, territory or district of the United States, or place noncon-
tiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, into any other
IU. S. Coast., Art. I, § 8, Clause 3. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 35
Sup. Ct. 824.2Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681.
s26 Stat. at L. 313, Chap. 728, Comp. Stat. 1913 § 8738.4 Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 42 L. Ed. 1088, 18 Sup. Ct. 664.
537 Stat. at L. 699, Chap. 90. Comp. Stat. 1913, 1 8738.
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state, territory or district of the United States, or place noncontig-
uous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or from any foreign
country into any state, territory or district of the United States, or
place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, which
said spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating
liquor is intended by any person interested therein, to be received,
possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original pack-
age or otherwise, in violation of any law of such state, territory, or
district of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, is hereby prohibited."
CONSTITUTIONALITY.
At the present writing, the constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon
law has not been passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United
States, which must be the final arbiter.
In Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky,0 digested on page 91 of
this issue, the constitutionality of the law was attacked on the ground
that it was in contravention of the interstate commerce clause of
the Constitution of the United States and of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, but the Supreme Court held that the Webb-Kenyon
Act was not applicable to the case and therefore the constitutionality
was not passed upon.
The United States District Court, District of Oregon, in United
States ex rel. Zimmerman & Co. v. Oregon Washington R. and
Nav. Co.,7 while entertaining some doubt of the constitutionality of
the Act, states: "In any event the law is not so clearly unconstitu-
tional as to justify this court in compelling defendants to violate it."
The Supreme Court of Kentucky upholds the constitutionality of
the Webb-Kenyon law in Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky,8 saying
that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce includes
the power to decide what is legitimate commerce and that Congress
by declaring the shipment of intoxicating liquors to be unlawful in
certain cases, thereby removes those cases from the pale of inter-
state commerce and subjects them to the regulation of the state.
Upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme Court
of Iowa9 says: "The Act simply removes the bar theretofore exist-
ing to the enforcement of police regulations because of the interstate
character of the transaction, and, if it be within the power of Con-
6835 Sup. Ct. 824, supra.
7210 Fed. 378.
8160 Ky. 66.
OState v. U. S. Express Co., 145 N. W. 451.
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gress to forbid shipment of all liquors in interstate traffic, why may
it not do less, and forbid the shipment under certain conditions?"
The Supreme Court of Kansas, also, has decided in favor of the
constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon law in State v. John Doe
(Columbia Brewery Co.).1° Against the objection that the law dele-
gates power of Congress to the states, the court says that the states
enact their liquor laws under the police power and that the effect of
the Webb-Kenyon law is merely to remove the inhibition due to the
fact that the regulation of interstate commerce is vested in Congress.
To the objection that Congress does not prescribe a uniform rule for
transportation of intoxicating liquors in interstate commerce, the
answer of the court is twofold. First, that the rule operates pre-
cisely the same for all states belonging to the same class and there-
fore is uniform. Second, that the Constitution of the United States
does not require uniform laws respecting interstate commerce as it
does respecting the subjects of duties, imposts and excises, natural-
ization and bankruptcy, and that even where uniformity is expressly
commanded, it is not essential that the practical results of the oper-
ation of an act of Congress shall be perfectly uniform. As an
instance, the court calls attention to the fact that the bankruptcy act
of 1898 was held to be uniform although it allowed exemptions to
bankrupts according to the diverse provisions of the respective
states, citing Hanover National Bank v. Moyses."
The Court of Criminal Appeals in Texas in Ex Parte Peedel2
says, obiter, that the Webb-Kenyon law is constitutional, but does
not pass upon it because the facts of the case before the court make
that unnecessary.
13
On the question of constitutionality see also Southern Express
Co. v. State14 and State v. Grier.' 5
SCOPM.
The Act by its terms applies only where the intoxicating liquors
are intended to be "received, possessed, sold, or in any manner
1092 Kan. 212.
11186 U. S. 181.
12(Tex. 1914) 170 S. W. 749.
MIn the following cases the question of the constitutionality was raised,
but not passed upon because the facts did not render that necessary: Atkin-
son v. So. Exp. Co., 94 S. C. 444, 78 S. R. 516, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 349.
Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 154 Ky. 462, 157 S. W. 908, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.)
342. Palmer v. So. Exp. Co. (Tenn.), 165 S. W. 236. Ex Parte Peede
(Texas 1914), 170 S. W. 749, supra.
14(Ala.) 66 So. 115.
15(Del.) 88 A. 579.
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used" in violation of any law of the state into which they are trans-
ported. In such cases, the shipment is declared to be unlawful and
the bar against state regulation of such commerce is removed.
But in all cases where the intoxicating liquor is not intended to
be "used, etc.," in violation of the state law, the protection afforded
by interstate commerce remains.
So, where liquor was purchased for the personal use of a con-
signee and his family, which use was permitted by the laws of Ten-
nessee, it was held that the Webb-Kenyon law did not apply and
that any attempt by the state to regulate the quantity to be shipped
in interstate commerce was void.1 6
Likewise in the case of Adams Express Co. v. Commonwealth
of Kentucky,17 digested on page 91 of this issue, the court held
that the Webb-Kenyon law did not apply to the case of intoxicating
liquors intended by the consignees for personal use, such use being
lawful in Kentucky, and that therefore a statute of Kentucky for-
bidding carriers to bring intoxicating liquors into or deliver them in
"dry" territory, was invalid as applied to interstate commerce.
It should be here noticed that the Webb-Kenyon law does not
prohibit transportation of liquors in violation of the law of the
state.18 So, a state law prohibiting the transportation of intoxicat-
ing liquor by any common carrier, unless the person to whom it is
consigned has a permit, is not valid as applied to interstate ship-
ments.
19
R.R.N.
16Palmer v. So. Exp. Co. (Tenn.), 165 S. W. 236, supra. See also Ex
Parte Peede, 170 S. W. 749, supra.
17U. S. (1915), 35 Sup. Ct. 824.
18Adams Exp. Co. v. Ky., 154 Ky. 462, 157 S. W. 908, supra.
IgHamm Brewery Co. v. Chi. R.. I. & P. Ry. Co., 215 Fed. 672 (District
Court D, Minnesota 1913).
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